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resolution of the threshold issue seems a far more preferable solu-
tion than postponement until full trial.
Pleas for legislative' 7 4 and judicial 75 action to develop no-fault
procedure have been made. Regardless of the solution finally
adopted - disposition by motion, postponement, or perhaps a
procedural system peculiar to no-fault - it is suggested that Cole
illustrates the potential for procedural frustration of no-fault in-
surance objectives and the need for clarification of no-fault proce-
dure.
JUDICIARY LAW
Judiciary Law art. 19: Postjudgment enforcement procedures held violative
of due process.
Article nineteen of the New York Judiciary Law 76 established
postjudgment procedures whereby a judgment debtor could be
held in civil contempt, fined, and imprisoned without a hearing. 77
A debtor who failed to comply with a judgment creditor's subpoena
to appear for deposition concerning his ability to satisfy the judg-
ment 1 78 could be subject to an ex parte order of the court to show
cause why he should not be held in contempt. 179 Failure to appear
in response to this order could result in a determination that the
debtor was in contempt of court,180 whereupon a final order could
issue directing that he be fined and/or imprisoned. 8 ' If a fine had
been imposed and affidavits of the attorney for the judgment
creditor satisfied the court that the order imposing the fine had
been served on the judgment debtor and that he had failed to
comply therewith, the court could issue an ex parte commitment
provide moderate savings and that this feature was not stressed as a major benefit of the
statute.
"'See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3211, commentary at 8, 11 (Supp. 1975).
175 Schwartz, supra note 146, at 58.
176 N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw §§ 750 et seq. (McKinney 1975).
177 d. §§ 756, 757, 770, 772-74.
178 CPLR 5223 permits a judgment creditor to compel disclosure of any information
pertinent to the satisfaction of the judgment by serving the debtor with a subpoena. The
judgment creditor may serve any or all of the following subpoenas: a subpoena requiring the
debtor's attendance for deposition; a subpoena duces tecum requiring the production of
books and papers; an information subpoena accompanied by written questions which re-
quire the debtor's written answers under oath. CPLR 5224.
1' CPLR 5251 makes "refusal or willful neglect' to obey a subpoena punishable as a
contempt of court. If the court was satisfied by creditor's affidavit that the judgment debtor
had failed to comply with the subpoena, it could issue an order directing the accused to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 757(1) (McKin-
ney 1975). For a more detailed discussion of this procedure see 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 5251,
commentary at 199 (Supp. 1975).
18' N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 750(A)(3) (McKinney 1975).
181 Id. §§ 770, 772.
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order for the judgment debtor's arrest and imprisonment without
further proceedings.1 8 2 In Vail v. Quinlan,1 83 a three-judge federal
district court184 found these procedures substantially devoid of
necessary due process protections. Accordingly, the court declared
the applicable sections 185 invalid and enjoined their further en-
forcement. 186
The Vail plaintiffs raised four objections to the existing statu-
112 Section 756 of the Judiciary Law provides:
Where the offense consists of a neglect or refusal to obey an order of the court,
requiring the payment of costs, or of a specified sum of money, and the court is
satisfied, by proof, by affidavit, that a personal demand thereof has been made, and
that payment thereof has been refused or neglected; it may issue, without notice, a
warrant to commit the offender to prison, until the costs or other sums of money,
and the costs and expenses of the proceeding, are paid, or until he is discharged
according to law.
Id. § 756.
183 406 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (three-judge court). Plaintiffs, all judgment debt-
ors, were certified as a class by a single district court judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(5)
(1970). The action was brought under 42 id. § 1983 and 28 id. § 1343(3) (1970). Plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW §§ ,756, 757, 765, 767, 769-75
(McKinney 1975), seeking money damages and declaratory and injunctive relief.
Plaintiff, Vail, had been the subject of a default judgment in the amount of $534.63.
Morrow, the judgment creditor's attorney, served him with a subpoena ordering his appear-
ance for the purpose of disclosing information concerning his ability to satisfy the judgment.
On the basis of Morrow's affidavits that Vail had been duly served but had not appeared,
and that such nonappearance had prejudiced the judgment creditor's rights and remedies,
the Dutchess County Court issued an order directing Vail to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt. When Vail failed to appear, the court held him in contempt and
imposed a fine of $270 as well as sheriffs fees and costs to be paid to the judgment creditor.
On the basis of Morrow's affidavits that Vail had been served with the order imposing the
fine and failed to comply, the court issued an ex parte commitment order directing the
sheriff to arrest Vail and commit him to the county jail until the fine and other fees were
paid. 406 F. Supp. at 956-57.
184 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) requires that a federal district court issuing "[ain interlocu-
tory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any
State statute" on the ground of unconstitutionality must consist of three judges.
185 N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw §§ 756, 757, 770, 772-75 (McKinney 1975).
188406 F. Supp. at 960. The defendants contended that the federal court should
properly abstain from ruling on the merits of the case. The abstention doctrine permits a
federal district court "to decline to exercise or to postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction in
deference to state court resolution of underlying issues of state law." Harman v. Forrsenius,
380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965). It is generally invoked when the state statute in question has not
yet been interpreted by the state courts and where such interpretation might avoid the
necessity of reaching federal issues. See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 54 (1973). The Vail
court found that there was no reason to invoke the doctrine since the statutes in question
were not subject to an interpretation that might avoid the constitutional issues, and there was
no question of how the state courts might implement them. 406 F. Supp. at 957-59.
Another reason for utilization of the abstention doctrine is to prevent federal courts
from staying or enjoining pending state criminal proceedings in all but exceptional circum-
stances, i.e. where expressly authorized by Congress, where it is necessary in aid of the
federal court's jurisdiction, to protect or effectuate the federal court's judgments, or where a
person will suffer irreparable damage if the state proceeding is not enjoined. See Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41, 43 (1971); 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). The Vail court found the
Younger doctrine, even as expanded to encompass pending civil proceedings which are
intimately connected with the enforcement of the state's penal laws, see Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Anonymous v. Association of the Bar, 515 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 122 (1975), no bar to its entertaining the present action. 406 F. Supp. at 958.
1976]
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tory scheme: (1) it allowed a finding of contempt and subsequent
imprisonment on the basis of an ex parte proceeding; 187 (2) it did
not require the show cause order to clearly indicate the purpose of
the hearing and the consequences of failure to comply; 188 (3) the
statute failed to mandate that the debtor be informed of his right
to counsel; 189 and (4) the sanctions imposed by the statutory
scheme were punitive in nature. 190
The court found all four objections to be well taken. A finding
of contempt, the court initially noted, "can be properly made only
upon a hearing with both parties present."19' The statutory scheme
in question provided an opportunity for a hearing upon the return
of the show cause order. If the debtor failed to appear, however,
he would be adjudged in contempt and subject to an order of
commitment. The court observed that where so serious an interest
as liberty is involved, due process requires more.'192 Providing a
hearing within 90 days of imprisonment'93 is insufficient; a hearing
is required before the debtor can be deprived of his liberty.' 9 4 With
respect to the plaintiffs' second contention, the court determined
that to properly serve its purpose a hearing must be preceded by
"complete and clear" notice.' 95 The court therefore instructed that
the show cause order should not only clearly specify the nature of
the hearing, but also give "a stark warning" concerning the con-
sequences of failure to appear.' 96 In upholding the plaintiffs'
third contention, the court noted that since the debtor could not be
'17 Plaintiffs challenged, inter alia, N.Y. JUDICIARY Law § 756 (McKinney 1975) (issue of
warrant without notice); id. § 757 (order to show cause); id. § 770 (final order directing
punishment); id. § 773 (amount of fine); id. § 774 (length of imprisonment and periodic
review of proceedings). 406 F. Supp. at 956.
I" In this regard, plaintiffs cited N.Y. JUDICIARY LAWv § 757(1) (McKinney 1975), which
contains no directives as to what the show cause order shall contain. 406 F. Supp. at 956.
189 Plaintiffs challenged N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw §§ 756, 770, 772, 774 (McKinney 1975),
which subject the debtor to imprisonment yet contain no provisions whereby he may be
informed of his right to counsel. 406 F. Supp. at 956.
190 Plaintiffs challenged the nature of the fines and imprisonment permitted under N.Y.
JUDICIARY LAw §§ 756, 770, 773, 774 (McKinney 1975). 406 F. Supp. at 959.
191 406 F. Supp. at 959 (footnote omitted).
19
2 Id.
193 N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 774(2) (McKinney 1975) provides in pertinent part:
In all instances where any offender shall have been imprisoned pursuant to article
nineteen of the judiciary law and where the term of such imprisonment is specified
to be an indeterminate period of time or for a term of more than three months,
such offender, if not then discharged by law from imprisonment, shall within ninety
days after the commencement of such imprisonment be brought, by the sheriff, or
other officer, as a matter of course personally before the court imposing such
imprisonment and a review of the proceedings shall then be held to determine
whether such offender shall be discharged from imprisonment.
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expected to understand, much less assert, the defenses that might
be raised, the right to a hearing would be ineffective without the
aid of counsel. 197 Finally, the court determined that the sanctions
imposed were neither remedial 98 nor coercive' 99 and are therefore
improper in a civil contempt proceeding.
The holding of the Vail court is unassailable. The require-
ments of due process are flexible, depending upon the extent to
which an individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss."200
The deprivation of an individual's liberty is a particularly onerous
sanction and calls for scrupulous safeguards. 20  The fact that im-
prisonment occurs within the context of a civil proceeding does not
alleviate the necessity for constitutional protection.20 2 Fundamental
to the notion of due process is an opportunity for a fair hearing
prior to the imposition of any sanction.20 3 The statutory scheme
under scrutiny in Vail, however, permitted imprisonment to result
from an ex parte determination.20 4 Its defects in this regard were
not remedied by the provision for an opportunity to be heard after
the commencement of incarceration since by that time the individ-
ual has already suffered a grievous loss. 20 5 Furthermore, a fair
197 Id. at 960. The court reasoned that "a debtor who is deprived of his liberty is as much
entitled to due process as is a defendant charged with a crime." Id. (footnote omitted).
10' The court noted that even when the alleged contempt does not cause any injury to
the creditor N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 773 (McKinney 1975) requires the imposition of a fine of
up to $250 plus costs. 406 F. Supp. at 960.
' The court explained that a coercive sanction cannot be justified if the person is
unable to comply. Yet, N.Y. JUDICIARY LAv § 756 (McKinney 1975) authorizes the arrest and
incarceration of a debtor even if he is unable to pay the fine required by the order. 406 F.
Supp. at 960.
200 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970), quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
21 See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (revocation of parole); Abbit
v. Bernier, 387 F. Supp. 57, 63 n.12 (D. Conn. 1974) (three-judge court) (state body
execution statutes unconstitutional absent provision for a preincarceration hearing).
202 In In re Harris, 69 Cal. 2d 486, 446 P.2d 148, 72 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1968) (en banc)
(Traynor, C.J.), the court held a mesne process of civil arrest which did not provide an
adequate opportunity to be heard with assistance of counsel to be a violation of due process.
The court noted: "A defendant who is deprived of his liberty by civil process is as much
entitled to due process of law as a defendant who is deprived of his liberty because he is
charged with a crime." Id. at 491, 446 P.2d at 152, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
203 See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 166-67 (1965) (finding of criminal
contempt requires notice and hearing). Although the Harris case dealt with criminal con-
tempt proceedings, much of the reasoning behind requiring such measures is equally
applicable to civil proceedings that may result in loss of liberty. See Abbit v. Bernier, 387 F.
Supp. 57, 63 n.12 (D. Conn. 1974) (three-judge court).2 14 See note 187 and accompanying text supra.
2" N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw § 774(2) (McKinney 1975) provides that the offender must be
brought before the court within 90 days of the commencement of his incarceration for a
review to determine whether he should be released. Section 775 permits the court in its
discretion to discharge the defendant when he is unable to endure imprisonment or comply
with the order. Id. § 775.
In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), the Court was asked to determine the
1976]
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hearing requires adequate notice to the accused 0 6 and access to
representation by counsel.20 7 Lacking these basic safeguards, the
enforcement procedures in question fell short of the minimal de-
mands of due process.
The objection on the ground that sanctions imposed were
punitive in nature is also valid. It is well established that while the
court in a civil contempt proceeding may impose either remedial or
coercive sanctions on a noncomplying party, punitive measures
must be avoided. 208 The theory behind this rule is that a civil
defendant is not being punished for a public wrong, but rather is
being compelled to indemnify the aggrieved party.20 9 Nevertheless,
the statutory scheme under consideration permitted the imposition
of a maximum fine of $250 plus costs notwithstanding the absence
constitutionality of prejudgment replevin statutes which allowed a private party to obtain an
ex parte writ of replevin without a hearing simply by posting a bond for double the value of
the property. The writ directed the sheriff to seize the property in question. The Court held
that due process required a hearing on the question of the right of repossession prior to
seizure of the property. In subsequent decisions, however, the Court retreated somewhat
from this position, essentially holding that the sequestration of property is not in violation of
due process so long as a judicial officer participates in issuing the order, and adequate
opportunity is given for ultimate judicial determination of liability. North Georgia Finishing,
Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
This appears to be the minimum standard applicable where the court seeks to protect one's
interest in property rights. It would seem that the deprivation of personal liberty demands a
more exacting measure of due process. See Desmond v. Hachey, 315 F. Supp. 328 (D. Me.
1970), wherein a three-judge court held the Maine Debtor Disclosure Law unconstitutional
since it permitted incarceration on the basis of an ex parte application without a prior
hearing.
206 Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (three-judge court). Notice, the
Lynch court held, should include "the date, time, and place of the hearing; a clear statement
of the purpose of the proceedings and the possible consequences to the subject thereof." Id.
at 388; accord, Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925); Parker v. United States, 153
F.2d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 1946).
27 See United States v. Sun Kung Kang, 468 F.2d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1972) (per
curiam) (civil contempt proceeding); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 388 (M.D. Ala.
1974) (three-judge court); In re Harris, 69 Cal. 2d 486, 490, 446 P.2d 148, 151-52, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 340, 343 (1968) (en banc) (Traynor, C.J.).2
°SSee Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 72-73 (1948); United States v. United Mine
Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418,
441-42 (1911).
20 The court in Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1946), summarized the
theory behind the sanctions imposed in a civil contempt proceeding as follows:
Proceedings in civil contempt are between the original parties and are instituted
and tried as a part of the main cause. Though such proceedings are "nominally
those of contempt" ... the real purpose of the court order is purely remedial - to
coerce obedience to a decree passed in complainant's favor, or to compensate
complainant for loss caused by respondent's disobedience of such decree. If impris-
onment is imposed in civil contempt proceedings, it cannot be for a definite term
.... The respondent can only be imprisoned to compel his obedience to a decree.
If he complies, or shows that compliance is impossible, he must be released, for his
confinement is not as punishment for an offense of a public nature. If a compen-
satory fine is imposed, the purpose again is remedial, to make reparation to a
complainant injured by respondent's disobedience of a court decree.
Id. at 70 (citations omitted).
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of any loss to the complainant.2 10 If the defendant failed to pay the
fine he could be imprisoned without any inquiry into his ability to
comply.211 A fine cannot be considered remedial in the absence of
loss. Nor can imprisonment be a valid method of coercion where
the defendant lacks the financial ability to comply with the court
order.
The procedure sought to be upheld by the State in Vail seri-
ously infringed upon the rights of judgment debtors who failed to
comply with show cause orders. The State's interest in rendering
enforceable judgments does not outweigh an individual's constitu-
tional right to due process. Hopefully, the legislature will act
quickly upon the recommendations of the Vail court and incorpo-
rate into the existing statutory framework safeguards sufficient to
protect the interests of all parties involved.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
Prior judgment available as defense but not counterclaim in summary
proceeding for rent.
In actions by landlords for nonpayment of rent, the New York
courts have exhibited an increasing awareness of the need to pro-
tect tenants' rights.2 12 Recently, in Myack v. Aruca,2 13 Judge Harba-
ter of the New York City Civil Court, Queens County, addressed
the question whether a tenant can interpose a prior New York
judgment as a setoff in his landlord's action for rent. The court
concluded that while the tenant could not assert the earlier judg-
ment as a counterclaim, he was entitled to raise the earlier judg-
ment as a defense since it could be equated with partial payment of
the rent due.214 Judge Harbater believed the interposition of the
2 1
1 See note 198 supra.
211 See note 199 supra.
212 In New York and other jurisdictions, the rights of tenants are continually being
expanded. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(warranty of habitability implied in all leases by operation of law; breach thereof gives rise to
normal remedies for breach of contract); Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81 Misc. 2d 328, 365 N.Y.S.
2d 681 (Rockland County Ct. 1975) (lease provision requiring tenants to pay additional sum
as rent upon commencement of any proceeding by landlord, irrespective of landlord's
success, held unconscionable); Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971) (tenants may raise defenses against payment where
landlord has violated law so as to substantially affect habitability of premises); Note,Judicial
Expansion of Tenants' Private Law Rights: Implied Warranties of Habitability and Safety in Residen-
tial Urban Leases, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 489 (1971); Comment, Tenant Remedies for a Denial of
Essential Services and for Harassment - The Nen York Approach, 1 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 66
(1972).
213 174 N.Y.LJ. 105, Dec. 2, 1975, at 9, col. 3 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County).
214 Id., at cols. 3-4.
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